They Created the Role. Filled It. Then Downgraded It After the Holder Was Removed
A senior role was created, filled, actively building a team — then eliminated after the holder was allegedly dismissed. The role reappeared at a lower grade. A second case followed. Meanwhile, DHCW claims 80% of staff rate it excellent. The pattern speaks louder than the survey.
17 February 2026 · 11 min read
This article deals with Employment Tribunal claims that are currently pre-hearing. It is important to distinguish clearly between verified facts drawn from public records — NHS Jobs postings, organisational structures, Senedd transcripts — and allegations contained in tribunal filings that have not yet been tested in court. We make that distinction throughout.
What follows is not an account of individual grievances. It is an account of a structural pattern — one that DHCW has never publicly acknowledged and cannot easily explain.
The Chief DevOps Officer: A Timeline From Public Records
The following timeline is constructed entirely from publicly available NHS Jobs postings and organisational records.
October 2023: NHS Jobs publishes vacancy M9025-23-0222. The role is Chief DevOps Officer at Digital Health and Care Wales, Agenda for Change Band 9 (GBP 101,000--GBP 117,000). It reports to Sam Lloyd, then a senior director. This is a serious appointment — Band 9 is the second-highest banding in the NHS pay structure, reserved for roles with strategic organisational responsibility.
Late 2023 / Early 2024: The appointment is made. The exact date is not publicly recorded, but subsequent postings confirm the role was filled.
October 2024: NHS Jobs publishes vacancy M9025-24-0162. The role is Head of Software Engineering, Band 8c (GBP 71,000--GBP 82,000). The job description states that this role reports to the Chief DevOps Officer. This posting confirms two things: the Chief DevOps Officer was in post as of October 2024, and they were actively building a team beneath them. An organisation does not recruit subordinates for a role it intends to eliminate.
December 2024: The Chief DevOps Officer is allegedly dismissed. An Employment Tribunal claim is filed alleging unfair dismissal and whistleblowing detriment. The claim is currently pre-hearing.
2026: NHS Jobs publishes vacancy M9025-26-0007. The role is Senior DevOps Engineer — a downgraded replacement for the Chief DevOps Officer position. The banding is lower. The seniority is lower. The strategic scope is narrower.
These are facts. They are drawn from public job postings that anyone can verify. They are not allegations, and they do not depend on the outcome of any tribunal.
The Convergence With Level 3
The timeline of the Chief DevOps Officer's tenure converges with DHCW's broader programme failures in ways that demand attention.
October 2024: The Chief DevOps Officer is in post and actively recruiting a team. The Head of Software Engineering vacancy confirms they are building capability.
December 2024: The Chief DevOps Officer is allegedly dismissed.
January 2025: The CEO of DHCW appears before the Senedd's Health and Social Care Committee. She is unable to provide programme delivery timelines. She reveals that only 7% of GP practices are using electronic prescriptions — the organisation's most advanced programme.
March 2025: The Welsh Government imposes Level 3 escalation across DHCW's entire programme portfolio, citing systemic delivery failures. [Source: GOV.WALES — DHCW Oversight and Escalation Framework, May 2025]
The proximity of these events raises an obvious question: was the Chief DevOps Officer raising concerns about the very programme failures that became publicly undeniable within months of their departure? We do not know. That is a matter for the tribunal. But the timeline is suggestive, and DHCW has offered no public explanation.
The Second Case
At least one additional senior employee has allegedly been dismissed from DHCW in circumstances connected to the raising of concerns. An Employment Tribunal claim has been filed. The case is pre-hearing, and fewer public details are available.
We note the existence of this second case not to make claims about its merits, but to establish that the Chief DevOps Officer's experience is not an isolated incident. When a pattern involves more than one person, it ceases to be a personnel matter and becomes an organisational question.
The Role Downgrade
The sequence of NHS Jobs postings tells its own story.
In 2023, DHCW decided it needed a Chief DevOps Officer at Band 9 — a role commanding a salary of GBP 101,000 to GBP 117,000, positioned at the strategic level of the organisation, reporting directly to a senior director. This was not a casual hire. It represented a judgement by DHCW's leadership that the organisation required senior DevOps capability.
By 2026, that judgement had been reversed. The replacement role — Senior DevOps Engineer — sits at a lower band, carries less authority, and has a narrower remit. The organisation did not simply lose a senior employee and replace them. It removed a senior employee and then downgraded the function they led.
This pattern has a specific organisational meaning. When a role is eliminated after its holder is removed, the message to the organisation is clear: the problem was not performance — it was the person. And when the role is recreated at a lower level, the message is clearer still: we want the function, but we do not want anyone with the seniority or authority to challenge us.
Whether or not this interpretation is correct in DHCW's specific case is a matter for the Employment Tribunal. But the pattern is visible to anyone who reads the job postings.
The 2018 Warning That Was Never Heeded
The treatment of those who raise concerns at DHCW did not begin in 2024. The roots are documented in the parliamentary record.
In 2018, the Senedd's Public Accounts Committee conducted an inquiry into NWIS, the predecessor body to DHCW. The Committee's findings on organisational culture were unambiguous:
"Digital transformation requires an open culture, but the committee found that the culture at NWIS was the antithesis of this."
The Committee reported that staff were "reluctant to be critical on the record." Members described "getting a pre-prepared line" from management rather than candid answers. The Committee warned that this closed culture "may be masking wider and deeper problems."
In April 2021, NWIS was dissolved and DHCW was created. The same staff transferred. The same leadership remained. Helen Thomas, who had served as Director of Information at NWIS, became CEO of DHCW. A change of name is not a change of culture. The PAC found NWIS's culture to be closed, defensive, and resistant to internal criticism. DHCW inherited that culture — along with the staff and leaders who had created it.
The Self-Reported Contradiction
DHCW's own internal staff survey reports that 80% of respondents describe it as an "excellent" or "very good" place to work. The organisation has been shortlisted for a "Best Place to Work" award. [Source: DHCW internal communications]
Set this against the full record:
- A parliamentary committee found NWIS's culture was "the antithesis of open"
- The same leadership transferred to DHCW
- At least two senior employees have allegedly been dismissed after raising concerns
- Those concerns were subsequently validated by the Welsh Government's own escalation process
- No whistleblowing data is published
- No disciplinary data is published
- No grievance data is published
- No leavers analysis is published
- Anonymous employee reviews on Glassdoor describe bullying, micro-management, and toxic culture
- All nine Level 3 programmes are failing
Either 80% of staff genuinely believe this is an excellent workplace while every programme fails, every external review identifies systemic problems, and senior employees who raise concerns are removed — or the survey is not capturing the reality of the organisation.
Internal surveys in organisations with closed cultures do not measure satisfaction. They measure compliance.
What DHCW Does Not Publish
Most NHS organisations in the UK publish annual data on:
- Whistleblowing disclosures: How many concerns were raised, through what channels, and what actions were taken
- Disciplinary proceedings: Aggregate data on formal disciplinary actions
- Staff turnover and leavers analysis: Who is leaving, from which roles, and why
DHCW publishes none of this.
For comparison: NHS England requires all NHS trusts to publish annual data on Freedom to Speak Up cases, including the number of concerns raised, the themes identified, and whether those raising concerns experienced detriment. [Source: NHS England Freedom to Speak Up guidance] NHS Wales has no equivalent mandatory disclosure regime, and DHCW has not voluntarily adopted one.
The absence of data is not neutral. If the Chief DevOps Officer's case and the second case are genuinely anomalous — if DHCW is, in general, an organisation that welcomes concerns and protects those who raise them — then publishing the data would demonstrate that. The fact that DHCW publishes none of this data, in circumstances where at least two Employment Tribunal claims allege whistleblowing-related dismissals, invites an inference that the data would not be reassuring.
What We Are Not Saying
We are not saying that the Chief DevOps Officer or the second claimant will succeed in their tribunal claims. Those claims will be tested against evidence, and the tribunal will reach its own conclusions.
We are not saying that DHCW dismissed these individuals because they were whistleblowers. That is the allegation, not a finding.
What we are saying is this:
The public record shows that a senior role was created, filled, actively building a team, and then eliminated after the holder's departure — with the function subsequently recreated at a lower grade.
The public record shows that at least two Employment Tribunal claims have been filed by former senior employees alleging connections between their dismissals and the raising of concerns.
The public record shows that DHCW publishes no whistleblowing data, no disciplinary data, and no leavers analysis that would allow external scrutiny of how it treats those who speak up.
The public record shows that these events occurred in the same period as programme failures so severe that the Welsh Government imposed Level 3 intervention — Enhanced Monitoring.
These facts form a pattern. DHCW has never publicly addressed that pattern.
Questions DHCW Must Answer
We ask DHCW to publish a public statement addressing the following. Each question is tied to a specific verifiable fact from the public record:
The role creation and elimination: DHCW advertised a Chief DevOps Officer role at Band 9 in October 2023 (M9025-23-0222). That role was filled, and a subordinate was recruited beneath it in October 2024 (M9025-24-0162). By 2026, the replacement posting (M9025-26-0007) was at a lower grade with a narrower scope. Why was a Band 9 strategic role downgraded after the holder's departure?
The data gap: DHCW publishes no whistleblowing disclosure numbers, no disciplinary statistics, no grievance data, and no leavers analysis. Will DHCW publish this data for each of the past five years, disaggregated by grade and directorate?
The survey contradiction: DHCW claims 80% of staff rate it excellent or very good. Will DHCW publish the full methodology, sample size, response rate, and question wording for this survey — and commission an independently administered staff survey with results published in full?
The Level 3 convergence: The Chief DevOps Officer's alleged dismissal in December 2024 preceded the Level 3 escalation in March 2025 by three months. Did any concerns raised by the Chief DevOps Officer or any other senior employee contribute to the Welsh Government's decision to escalate? Were any such concerns shared with the Welsh Government before or after the escalation decision?
The second case: At least one additional Employment Tribunal claim has been filed by a former senior employee. How many Employment Tribunal claims alleging whistleblowing detriment or unfair dismissal connected to the raising of concerns are currently pending against DHCW?
If there is an innocent explanation for this pattern, the Welsh public deserves to hear it. If there is not, the Senedd deserves to investigate.
Right of Reply: CareNHS welcomes a response from DHCW to the matters raised in this article. No response has been received to date. Contact: carenhs@carenhs.org
This article is based on NHS Jobs postings (M9025-23-0222, M9025-24-0162, M9025-26-0007), Senedd Public Accounts Committee reports (2018), DHCW board papers and governance documents, Welsh Government escalation records (March 2025), and information provided to this campaign. Where allegations are stated, they are clearly identified as such.
carenhs.org is an independent public accountability campaign focused on NHS Wales digital infrastructure. We welcome corrections and responses from DHCW, the Welsh Government, and any individual named in this article. Contact: info@carenhs.org
Related pages:
- Toxic Culture — The Evidence — the documented culture at DHCW
- Toxic Culture — Self-Reported Surveys vs. Reality — 91.3% claim vs. the national staff survey reality
- What They Don't Publish — zero whistleblowing or disciplinary data
- Culture Reform — independent whistleblowing protection