Breaking News: Helen Thomas to Step Down as CEO of DHCW. Don't Waste This Chance for True Renewal
Helen Thomas has told Digital Health and Care Wales staff she will step down as chief executive. Her going is good news, years late. Her real legacy is an organisation hollowed out of technical ability, and the new government's test is what it does next: who replaces her, who else goes, and whether DHCW is rebuilt or just repainted.
16 October 2026 · 11 min read
Helen Thomas is to step down as chief executive of Digital Health and Care Wales (DHCW), the body Wales built in 2021 out of the discredited NHS Wales Informatics Service (NWIS) without replacing the people who had run it. Finally. It is the right decision, and it is years late.
CareNHS understands she told staff in an internal announcement this week. No public announcement has yet been made. In our view, she was pushed out by a new government that had run out of patience.
The question everyone in Welsh digital health is asking is why it took so long. The question that matters more is what happens next.
The same exit, twice
Thomas follows her predecessor at NWIS, Andrew Griffiths, out of the door. He stepped down in December 2019, after a 2018 Public Accounts Committee inquiry found NWIS running "archaic and fragile" systems, with a culture "the antithesis of open" and a data-centre outage every nine days. Thomas, NWIS's Director of Information since 2017, took over as interim director, and then as DHCW's founding chief executive. The rebrand changed the name, not the leadership.
On 9 December 2020 both of them, the outgoing director and the incoming one, were made honorary Professors of Practice by the University of Wales Trinity Saint David, at the same ceremony where NWIS renewed its partnership with that university. For what achievements, exactly, the record does not say.
Between April 2021 and March 2026, DHCW's own accounts record about £919 million of public money passing through the organisation: £816 million of revenue spending and £102 million of capital. That is five years of DHCW alone. Add NWIS's last two years: £88.5 million in 2019-20, the year Griffiths handed over to Thomas, and £101.9 million in 2020-21 with Thomas in charge. The total comes to £1.11 billion in seven years, before counting a single earlier NWIS year or any NWIS capital spending.
In our view, Wales got remarkably little for it. The National Data Resource, the flagship Thomas led from her NWIS days, saw its forecast benefits cut from £151.5 million to £41 million while its cost rose from £57.2 million to £73.6 million. It is doubtful it will ever deliver any value. The intensive care system was found by an external review to be "not clinically acceptable in its current form". The data centres failed, again and again, year after year. Nine flagship programmes ended up under Welsh Government escalation at the same time, and four more were closed, paused or cut back. DHCW's own Director of Finance put its total demonstrated return at £0.5 million, in non-cash time savings, from a single system. A VAT error cost the Exchequer around £4.3 million in interest alone. And in April 2026 the Welsh Government escalated DHCW to Level 4, Targeted Intervention, over "concerns around delivery, accountability and leadership." That was the first time leadership had been named in the grounds.
On that record, we think Helen Thomas will be remembered as one of the worst chief executives the Welsh NHS has had, and among the least effective digital leaders any health system in these islands has produced. Her departure will be greeted with relief by many people who worked under her, and by many more who depended on what DHCW was supposed to deliver.
What she leaves behind
Thomas leaves an organisation without vision, direction or purpose. It is out of step with what patients, clinicians and the public expected of it. It has failed countless patients who waited for systems that never arrived or arrived not working.
She also leaves an organisation that has been hollowed out of technical ability. That is not a judgement on the people who work there. Many of them are capable, and they came to DHCW wanting to build something. It is a judgement on what was done to them. There was no career path and no meaningful budget for upskilling. Direction did not come from the top. Leadership was absent when it was needed and unresponsive when it was told things it did not want to hear. Good people learned helplessness, because their skill, energy and creativity went into work that leadership then squandered.
DHCW's own staff survey shows what that does. In a single year, the share of staff confident that DHCW would act on their concerns fell from 84.8% to 59.2%. The share who felt safe to speak up fell from 84.8% to 62.8%. That collapse happened on a higher response rate. Days lost to sickness rose 82% in three years, to 15,846 in 2024-25, and more than half the workforce took sickness absence that year. All the while, DHCW was collecting workplace wellbeing awards. Stress and anxiety are now the largest single cause, at 5,209 working days lost in a year. In September 2026 the board heard that sickness had hit its highest level in twelve months.
Under Thomas, mediocrity and passivity became virtues. Anyone who pushed for real change met resistance first, then was undermined, and in some cases lost their job. She leaves behind a trail of careers ended or stalled, belonging to people who dared to want something bigger and better for digital healthcare in Wales, and who were treated as a threat for it. We will be writing about specific cases, with details, in the coming months.
She did not do this alone. She surrounded herself with a like-minded circle and built the organisation in its image. Three members of her executive board took honorary Professor of Practice titles from the university that was also DHCW's landlord. Asked whether that relationship had been weighed as a conflict of interest, DHCW replied only that "the WIDI agreement and the lease agreement are two separate agreements." Her medical director, Rhidian Hurle, has out-earned her on salary in four of the five years. His official biography on DHCW's own board page signs off as "Professor Rhidian Hurle": the plain academic title, with neither "honorary" nor "of Practice" attached, for an honorary title from that same landlord university. The same biography opens by calling him "Mr Rhidian Hurle". In our view, too many of those at the top have shown more care for their prestige, power and pay than for DHCW's stated mission of helping Welsh patients and clinicians.
She leaves with a pension that DHCW's own accounts value, as a cash-equivalent transfer value, at £1.8 million. That has risen by 71% across the years in which DHCW went from routine oversight to Targeted Intervention.
Why the wrong people rose
One of the fatal mistakes of DHCW under Thomas was putting stakeholder management and political savvy above technical expertise.
Recruitment for key technical roles prized the wrong qualities. Experts were driven out, and political players took their places: people skilled at managing perceptions rather than delivering anything. The result was an organisation fluent in reassurance and short of the ability to build. It reported 94% of its milestones delivered in the same year it was escalated for "repeated failure to deliver".
That mistake cannot be repeated.
What happens next is what matters
Pushing Thomas out was the right decision by the new government. It is not, on its own, a reform. The test for Mabon ap Gwynfor, as Cabinet Minister for Health and Care, starts now:
- Who replaces her? If the answer is another chief executive from the same network, chosen for the same qualities, then nothing will change. The NWIS-to-DHCW rebrand already ran that experiment, and Wales has spent five years and nearly a billion pounds learning the result. It is now further behind England and comparable small countries than it was when DHCW was founded.
- Who else goes? Thomas did not run DHCW alone. If the rest of the circle stays in place, the organisation will keep running in the same direction, further into the ground.
- What else changes? An independent well-led review of DHCW is due to report by the end of November. It must be published in full, and its findings must drive the next decisions rather than follow them.
DHCW cannot simply be repainted. Its next chief executive must be:
- A technical leader with a proven record. The job needs someone who has delivered large-scale digital transformation and turned around large, failing organisations.
- Open to candidates from outside the NHS. NHS experience is not necessary. Technical and leadership excellence is.
- Given real authority. The new chief executive needs a clear vision, and the power to rebuild the whole structure from top to bottom where that is needed, not just the floor they inherit.
Helen Thomas's departure is good news, and it is years late. Plaid Cymru now holds the one thing the last government never used: a clean break. Please don't waste this chance for true renewal.
Sources
- Senedd Public Accounts Committee, 2018 inquiry into NWIS: see What is DHCW?
- University of Wales Trinity Saint David, University of South Wales and NWIS press releases, 9 December 2020 (Professors of Practice): see The Professors of DHCW
- DHCW total expenditure 2021-22 to 2024-25: DHCW response to FOI/6781535, 15 May 2026. Capital expenditure and 2025-26 figures: DHCW Annual Reports and Accounts 2021-22 to 2025-26 (Performance Report, financial performance section).
- NWIS expenditure 2019-20 and 2020-21: NWIS was hosted by Velindre University NHS Trust and reported as the "NWIS" segment in the Trust's accounts. Velindre University NHS Trust, Annual Accounts 2020-21, Operating Segments note (NWIS total operating expenses: £101,929k in 2020-21; £88,461k in 2019-20). Confirmed in the 2019-20 accounts (Operating Segments) and the 2021-22 accounts (Operating expenses: "NWIS expenditure reported in 2020/2021 totalled £101,929k").
- National Data Resource benefits and costs: DHCW response to FOI/6695830. See The Empty Platform.
- WICIS external review: see Celebrating the 5-Year Crash Against Reality.
- Level 4 escalation, 8 April 2026: DHCW Portfolio Delivery Committee papers, 30 April 2026 (Escalation Status Update). Welsh Government, DHCW oversight and escalation framework, May 2026.
- Staff survey, sickness absence, VAT interest, remuneration and pension figures: DHCW Annual Report and Accounts 2025-26. See Deeper Into Delusion.
- £0.5 million demonstrated return: DHCW Director of Finance, Welsh Government public accountability meeting, January 2026. See £600 Million In. £0.5 Million Out and What They Admitted.
- Nine escalated programmes and four closed, paused or descoped: Welsh Government Level 3 Escalation Framework, May 2025; DHCW Annual Report 2024-25. See Nine Programmes, Zero Results.
- Sickness absence 2021-22 to 2024-25: DHCW Annual Reports. See Best Place to Work(-Related Stress).
- Technium 2 lease and the "two separate agreements" answer: DHCW response to FOI/6781535.
- Rhidian Hurle's board biography: DHCW, Meet the board: Rhidian Hurle, as viewed 16 October 2026.
Related pages
- The Professors of DHCW
- Deeper Into Delusion
- The Verdict Nobody Reported
- The Chair Who Walked Away
- The Organisation That Cannot Learn
- £600 Million In. £0.5 Million Out
- Nine Programmes, Zero Results
- Best Place to Work(-Related Stress)
- The Safety Case DHCW Made Against Itself
- National Data Resource: 10 Years Late, £100 Million Short
Digital Health and Care Wales is under Level 4 (Targeted Intervention) by the Welsh Government. CareNHS invites responses from Digital Health and Care Wales and from Helen Thomas on the matters raised in this article. If received, we will publish them in full.
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